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PUNISHING WARMONGERS FOR THEIR 
“MAD AND CRIMINAL PROJECTS” – 
BISMARCK’S PROPOSAL FOR AN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT TO 
ASSIGN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE 
FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR 
Benjamin E. Brockman-Hawe* 
The idea of punishing aggressive war is routinely presented as having been first conceived of in 
the wake of the First World War. This conventional narrative is incorrect; the intellectual seed for 
the project had begun to take root long before, in the reactions to the interstate conflicts of the nine-
teenth century. This article explores one of the most significant moments from aggression’s unappre-
ciated ‘pre-history’; Chancellor Bismarck’s pursuit of a trial before an international criminal court 
of the Franco-Prussian War’s (1870-1) French ‘intellectual originators and instigators.’ Although 
the proposal ultimately failed to attract the political and public support necessary for its implementa-
tion, it prompted in its own time an unprecedented discussion on the viability of international criminal 
responsibility for aggression and international criminal courts. The proposal later took on new life as 
both a precedent and an anti-precedent as these ideas resurfaced periodically after 1870. 
The goal of this paper is to restore Bismarck’s proposal to its rightful place in the story of the 
crime’s development. At stake is more than historic fidelity; contemporary expectations of what in-
ternational criminal law can accomplish, what circumstances should or could accompany international 
criminal law’s invocation, and what the parameters of the crime of aggression should be are shaped 
by such histories. As the 2010 Kampala Amendments to the Rome Statute are now a single acces-
sion away from accumulating the requisite number of ratifications to come into effect, raising the 
prospect that the International Criminal Court will imminently be tasked with adjudicating the first 
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aggression case in over seventy years, the need for reflection on these issues has taken on unusual 
salience. 
 
Few wars can lay claim to having had as transformative an effect as that between 
France and Prussia in 1870-1;1 its impact on the national political cultures of the 
belligerents, the conduct of armies on the field, and the hierarchy of the continent’s 
Great Powers has been given wide coverage in the literature.2 The conflict also re-
mains a source of fascination among scholars of international law, who have framed 
it as a milepost that divides the history of the field into ‘before’ and ‘after’ phases. 
The war has been credited with creating the modern concept of neutrality,3 crystal-
lizing the idea of the ‘war crime,’4 inspiring the modern law of occupation,5 turning 
international opinion against reprisals,6 catalyzing Europe-wide efforts to organize 
professional organizations that would clarify the rules of warfare,7 including the sta-
tus of irregular fighters in the law of war,8 altering the vector of the law of aerial 
warfare,9 and reviving interest in interstate arbitration.10 Despite the thoroughness 
with which the war’s legal and historic twists and turns have been mapped, one sig-
nificant event remains obscure, even among specialist historians: the proposal by 
                                                                                                                   
 1. Consistent with common usage, ‘Prussia’ will be used throughout this paper to refer to the North German 
Confederation, of which Prussia was the predominant member, collectively with the South German states of Baden, 
Bavaria and Wuerttemberg, all of which mobilized for war against France.  
 2. Among its many effects, the war resulted in the emergence of a unified and powerful Germany, comprised 
of the North German Confederation and southern German-speaking states, and enriched by the annexation of Alsace 
and two-thirds of Lorraine. JONATHAN STEINBERG, BISMARCK: A LIFE 301-11 (2011). By 1898 over 7,000 books 
had been written about the war. Col. John Lorimer, Why Would Modern Military Commanders Study the Franco-Prussian 
War?, 5 DEFENSE STUDIES 108, 119 (2006). Among the most notable contemporary works dealing with the war are 
the following: MICHAEL HOWARD, THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR: THE GERMAN INVASION OF FRANCE, 1870-1871 
(1962); GEOFFREY WAWRO, THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR: THE GERMAN CONQUEST OF FRANCE IN 1870-1871 
(2003); DAVID WETZEL, A DUEL OF GIANTS – BISMARCK, NAPOLEON III, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE 
FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR (2001); DAVID WETZEL, A DUEL OF NATIONS – GERMANY, FRANCE, AND THE 
DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1870-1871 (2012). 
 3. MAARTJE ABBENHUIS, AN AGE OF NEUTRALS: GREAT POWER POLITICS, 1815-1914, 124-126 (2014). 
 4. Daniel Marc Segesser, ‘Unlawful Warfare is Uncivilised’: The International Debate on the Punishment of War Crimes, 
1872-1918, 14 EUR. REV. HIST., 215, 224, n.2 (2007). 
 5. EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 39 (2nd ed. 2012); Sibylle Scheipers, The 
Status and Protections of Prisoners of War and Detainees, in THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF WAR 394, 403 (Hew Strachan 
& Sibylle Scheiper eds., 2011); Daniela L. Caglioti, Waging War on Civilians: The Expulsion of Aliens in the Franco-Prussian 
War 221 PAST AND PRESENT 161, 189 (2013). 
 6. ALEX J. BELLAMY, MASSACRES AND MORALITY: MASS ATROCITIES IN AN AGE OF CIVILIAN IMMUNITY 73-
74 (2012); GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE: THE MODERN HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICTS 171 (1980). 
 7. ANDREW FITZMAURICE, SOVEREIGNTY, PROPERTY AND EMPIRE, 1500-2000, 242-3 (2014); PAUL LAITY, 
THE BRITISH PEACE MOVEMENT 1870-1914, 52 (2002); BENVENESTI, supra note 5, at 39; MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, 
THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1870–1960, 39 (2002); Irwin 
Abrams, The Emergence of the International Law Societies, 19 THE REV. OF POL. 361, 367 (1957). 
 8. I. P. Trainin, Questions of Guerrilla Warfare in the Law of War, 40 AM. J. INT’L L. 534, 540 (1946). 
 9. Roger F. Williams, Developments in Aerial Law 75 U. PENN. L. REV. 139 (1926); Elbridge Colby, Aërial Law and 
War Targets 19 AM. J. INT’L L. 702, 708 (1925). 
 10. Martin Ceadel, ‘The Alabama Claims,’ the Geneva Arbitration of 1872, and their significance in Britain, in GENÈVE ET 
LA PAIX: ACTEURS ET ENJEUX: TROIS SIÈCLES D’HISTOIRE: ACTES DU COLLOQUE HISTORIQUE TENU AU PALAIS DE 
L’ATHÉNÉE, LES 1-2-3 NOVEMBRE 2001, at 101, 109 (Roger Durand, Jean-Daniel Candaux & Antoine Fleury, eds., 
2003). 
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Prussia’s “Iron Chancellor,” Otto von Bismarck, for the prosecution before an inter-
national criminal court of French opinion-makers, for the international crimes of ag-
gression and incitement to aggressive war. 
Bismarck’s proposal—on those rare occasions where it has surfaced as part of 
the public conversation surrounding the punishment of international crimes—has 
until now been treated more as an afterthought than with any real insight or analy-
sis.11 This study provides an enriched perspective by: reviewing the details of the 
proposal, analyzing the motives that prompted the Chancellor to champion prosecu-
tions before an international criminal court, exploring how some among Bismarck’s 
audience perceived the scheme, and tracing out the longer historical legacy of the 
initiative.  
* * * 
The origins and course of the war is a story quickly told. The expulsion of 
Queen Isabella II from Spain in 1868 left a vacuum in leadership that could only be 
filled by another monarch. Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, at the urg-
ing of Wilhelm Friedrich Ludwig (William I), Emperor of Prussia, and his chief min-
ister Bismarck, accepted the offer and moved to assume the throne. News of Leo-
pold’s candidature provoked a severe reaction in France, where the move was viewed 
as an aggrandizement of Prussian power at the expense of French influence and pres-
tige. Napoleon III and his ministers reacted by whipping up anti-Prussian sentiment 
in government circles and in the press. A diplomatic mission, bearing threats of war 
unless the candidacy was disavowed, was dispatched to meet with William. The mis-
sion was a success, in that Leopold withdrew his candidacy and William retracted his 
support. But the French pressed for a commitment that William refrain from endors-
ing the Prince in the future—effectively a demand that the Prussian King forbid his 
candidature. William refused, feeling that his personal honor was at stake. After an-
nouncing that he considered the matter closed, he broke off further direct talks with 
the French representative, but left open the possibility of further inter-governmental 
negotiations. 
Matters might have proceeded on that basis, but Bismarck, with the support of 
Chief of General Staff of the Prussian Army Helmuth von Moltke, released an ac-
count of this meeting to the press deliberately calculated to inflame passions; he de-
clined to report William’s conciliatory gestures, and made it seem as though the 
French Ambassador had been snubbed by the King and that relations between the 
Powers had been terminated as a result. Napoleon, with the blessing of the French 
Council of Ministers, declared war on July 19, 1870.12 
The French severely underestimated Prussian military speed, efficiency, and tac-
tics, and one by one their armies were overwhelmed or pinned down. The first phase 
of the war culminated in Napoleon’s surrender at Sedan in early September, from 
                                                                                                                   
 11. For post-war works that briefly mention the proposal, see infra notes 95-104.  
 12. For more on the events leading up to the war, see generally DAVID WELCH, JUSTICE AND THE GENESIS OF 
WAR, 84-91 (1993); WETZEL, A DUEL OF GIANTS, supra note 2.  
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whence he was packed off to Kassel-Wilhelmshöhe to spend the rest of the war in 
ostentatious captivity.13 As the Prussian forces approached Paris, news of Napoleon’s 
defeat provoked a riot in the French capital that toppled the Bonaparte regime. The 
Imperial Court fled as a new “Government of National Defense” (GND) assumed 
political responsibility in the French capital and proclaimed a Third Republic.14 Paris 
was encircled by Prussian troops fourteen days later, largely cutting off GND officials 
and Parisians from the world. Those who wished to travel or communicate across 
Prussian lines had to rely on the indulgence of the invaders or engage a balloonist to 
carry post or persons.15 But the city remained defiant despite its isolation. The Paris 
press fulminated against the invaders as the new government pledged to surrender 
“neither a clod of our territory nor a stone of our fortresses” to the enemy,16 declared 
a guerre à outrance, and encouraged attacks on Prussian forces by irregular troops (un-
privileged belligerents or francs-tireurs).17 
It is against this backdrop—Bonapartists in exile, Napoleon III a prisoner, Paris 
fully invested but unyielding—that Bismarck articulated his plan for prosecutions. “I 
have,” he announced as he sat down to dinner on October 14, 1870, “a lovely idea in 
connection with the conclusion of peace. It is to appoint an International Court for 
the trial of all those who have instigated the war, newspaper writers, deputies, sena-
tors, and ministers.”18 After acknowledging that Napoleon III or Adolphe Thiers 
(President of the Third Republic) might find themselves on the dock, he explained 
his vision of the tribunal: “My idea was that each of the Great Powers should appoint 
an equal number of judges, America, England, Russia and so forth, and that we 
should be the prosecutors.”19 He was skeptical, however, that the Russians or the 
British would participate, and in their absence the court might “be composed of the 
two nations who have suffered most from the war, that is to say, of Frenchman and 
Germans.”20 As he so often did, he tasked his press secretary (and later biographer) 
Julius Busch with introducing the idea through the papers.21 The proposal was pub-
lished in the North-German Correspondent in late October 1870: 
                                                                                                                   
 13. Napoleon surrendered not as head of state, but in his personal capacity, leaving the countries on a war footing. 
WETZEL, A DUEL OF NATIONS, supra note 2, at 79. 
 14. ALICE L. CONKLIN, SARAH FISHMAN, ROBERT ZARETSKY, FRANCE AND ITS EMPIRE SINCE 1870, 34-38 
(2011). The dethroned Empress Eugénie fled to England, while several other members of the former Imperial court 
escaped to Brussels. Heidi Mehrkens, The Politics of Waiting: The Imperial Couple, Napoleon III and Eugénie, in MONARCH 
AND EXILE: THE POLITICS OF LEGITIMACY FROM MARIE DE MÉDICIS TO WILHELM II 230, 233 (Philip Mansel & 
Torsten Riotte, eds., 2011). See also ABBENHUIS, supra note 3, at 136-137. 
 15. These events are ably covered by WETZEL, A DUEL OF NATIONS, supra note 2, at 26-99, and WAWRO, supra 
note 2, at 230-256.  
 16. JAMES HARVEY ROBINSON, READINGS IN EUROPEAN HISTORY: A COLLECTION OF EXTRACTS FROM THE 
SOURCES CHOSEN WITH THE PURPOSE OF ILLUSTRATING THE PROGRESS OF CULTURE IN WESTERN EUROPE 
SINCE THE GERMAN INVASIONS 545 (1906). 
 17. WETZEL, A DUEL OF NATIONS, supra note 2, at 86, 101, 112, 150-153, 218; HOWARD, supra note 2, at 249-
252. 
 18. MORITZ BUSCH, BISMARCK: SOME SECRET PAGES OF HIS HISTORY 252 (1898). 
 19. Id.  
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. at 276. For a brief description of Busch’s career prior to 1870 and his working relationship with Bismarck, 
see ROBERT H. KEYSERLINGK, THE PRESS AND BISMARCK IN IMPERIAL GERMANY 91-92 (1977). 
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If a universally acknowledged and codified system of international law existed, it would 
be sure to contain provisions for the adequate punishment of such persons as should, 
on clear legal evidence, be convicted of having willfully originated or instigated an 
aggressive war. It has been already proposed to establish a European Areopagus [Court 
of Appeal or permanent inter-European legislative body] invested with the right of 
condemning without appeal all who, moved by a mere inordinate passion for war or 
love of strife, or urged by a thirst for universal empire, should assail peaceful nations 
in furtherance of their own mad and criminal projects. What an amount of wretched-
ness might have been spared the human race had it been possible to call to account 
contemnors of human rights in every class of society, and to publicly visit them with 
condign punishment. It must be confessed that no country has ever suffered more 
than Germany from the injustice and rapacity of other nations. During the Thirty 
Years’ War she saw her plains invaded by her neighbors, who, after sucking out the 
marrow of the land, retreated laden with booty to their homes. From 1806 till 1813 
Germany was again the victim of unheard-of wrongs and ineffable sufferings. And yet 
but one of the authors of her manifold miseries [Napoléon I] paid the penalty of his 
crimes in being relegated, like another Prometheus, to a solitary and distant rock. 
 
The necessity and justice of making the authors of a war, and not, as hitherto, merely 
their subordinates and tools, responsible for their own acts before the world, have 
suggested the idea in Governmental circles of stipulating as a condition of peace be-
tween France and Germany that the intellectual originators and instigators of the pre-
sent war shall not escape with impunity. Among the responsible parties are included 
the entire Executive which devised the invasion of Germany: the statesmen who ap-
proved it; the Ministers by whom it was recommended; the orators who labored for, 
demanded, and welcomed it; the journalists whose constant text was war, and who 
discounted the triumphs of the coming campaign. The verdict of ‘Guilty’ or ‘Not 
Guilty,’ and the penalty to be inflicted, would be left to a jury composed of citizens of 
neutral states, supposing those States to lend the plan their concurrence; or, in case of 
their refusal, the jurymen might be taken from the two belligerent nations themselves. 
The institution of an international jury for the punishment of peace-breakers is re-
garded in Governmental circles as likely to furnish no unsatisfactory guarantee for the 
future peace of Europe.22 
* * * 
Bismarck’s announcement is striking for a number of reasons. First, proposing 
the criminalization and punishment of aggression and incitement to aggressive war 
was out of step with the arc of nineteenth-century international law. Between the jus 
ad bellum and the jus in bello it was the former that had been left by nineteenth-century 
                                                                                                                   
 22. No title, THE NORTH-GERMAN CORRESPONDENT (London, England) Oct. 22, 1870, at 1 (available in the 
British Library). From there, the (second paragraph of) the proposal was republished by the global press. Reprinted 
as Incidents of the War, THE TIMES (London, England), Nov 1, 1870, at 5. In the United States the proposal first 
appeared on the front page of the Supplement to Harper’s Weekly of December 3, 1870.  
The term ‘Areopagus’ was used variously to refer alternatively to the idea of a standing international court of 
arbitration, or the idea of a governing body akin to the modern United Nations. For an example of the former usage 
see Our difficulty with the United States, 32 BANKERS’ MAGAZINE 296 (1872). Examples of the latter are noted in JAN 
MATIN LEMNITZER, POWER, LAW AND THE END OF PRIVATEERING 109 (2014). 
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scholars and statesmen to “wither on the bough,”23 and what limits on the use of 
force that did exist lacked the force of law, operating instead as a “blend between 
legal and moral/political considerations.”24 In contrast, what we now call interna-
tional humanitarian law was experiencing a renaissance, albeit confined to scholarly 
and diplomatic circles. New treaties curtailing a few of the more egregiously harsh 
practices of war were widely ratified by European states, including the 1864 Geneva 
Convention, which formalized protections for the wounded, including the protection 
of medical personnel,25 and the 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg, which outlawed 
as excessively cruel the use of certain categories of exploding bullets.26 These treaties 
broke new ground, defined obligations with relative precision, and stamped the new 
rules with explicit international and legal imprimatur. It was the laws of war, in short, 
that had captured intellectual momentum and diplomatic imagination prior to 1870. 
Bismarck’s proposal was also out of sync with developments on the battlefield. 
The French army, government, and public had constantly abused the Red Cross em-
blem adopted at Geneva as the official sign of protected army medical personnel, 
military hospitals and ambulances, and Prussian soldiers were repeatedly wounded or 
killed by prohibited bullets.27 Upon assuming power, the GND compounded these 
violations by strenuously encouraging francs-tireurs, in contravention of (Prussia’s un-
derstanding of) international law.28 
In the face of widespread and clear violations of the laws of war, why pursue 
the prosecution of those who incited and perpetrated the conflict instead of battle-
field violators? One likely reason is that prosecuting the latter would have necessarily 
                                                                                                                   
 23. GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945, at 20 (1994). See also Davis Brown, Contemporary International 
Law on the Decision to Use Armed Force, in THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO MILITARY ETHICS 38 (James 
Turner Johnson & Eric D. Patterson, eds., 2015) (“By the turn of the twentieth century, jus ad bellum was virtually 
non-existent in positive international law.”); PETER HOUGH, UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL SECURITY 39 (3d ed. 2013).  
 24. Oliver Corten, Formalization and Deformalization as Narratives of the Law of War, in NEW APPROACHES TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE EUROPEAN AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCES 251, 261 (José María Beneyto & David 
Kennedy eds., 2012); see also James T. Johnson, Ideology and the Jus Ad Bellum: Justice in the Initiation of War, 41 J. AM. 
ACADEMY OF RELIG. 212, 221 (1973) (“There is in international law no longer a ‘just war doctrine,’ in the classic 
sense, by the time of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870.”); DAVID KENNEDY, DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIANISM 242 (2008) (“In the end, law governing the decision to go to war languished 
for a century after the decline of natural law – until it was revived by the United Nations Charter as the modern “law 
of force.”). 
 25. GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED IN ARMIES IN 
THE FIELD, Aug. 22, 1864, 18 Martens 440, reprinted in 1 AJIL 90 (1907) (Supp.), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/120?OpenDocument. 
 26. DECLARATION RENOUNCING THE USE, IN TIME OF WAR, OF EXPLOSIVE PROJECTILES UNDER 400 
GRAMMES WEIGHT. ST. PETERSBURG, Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, 1 AM. J. INT’L. L. Supp. 95 (1907), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/130.  
 27. PIERRE BOISSIER, FROM SOLFERINO TO TSUSHIMA: HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF 
THE RED CROSS 247-54 (1985); KARL ABEL, LETTERS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BEFORE AND DURING THE 
WAR OF 1870, 488 (1871). See also National Archives [hereinafter NA], Foreign Office [hereinafter FO] 881/1897, 
No. 283 Count Bismarck to Count Bernstorff (January 9, 1871) (complaining of French violations of the laws and 
customs of war). 
 28. No. 283, supra note 27. See also Lester Nurick & Roger W. Barrett, Legality of Guerrilla Forces Under the Laws of 
War, 40 AM. J. INT’L. L. 573-74 (1946). See also SIBYLLE SCHEIPERS, UNLAWFUL COMBATANTS: A GENEALOGY OF 
THE IRREGULAR FIGHTER 88-91 (2015). Francs-tireurs would also have been considered illegal fighters by the stand-
ards adopted four years later in the (non-binding) Brussels Declaration, which subsequently formed the basis for the 
1907 Hague Rules on the Laws and Customs of War on Land. Sibylle Scheipers, The Status and Protections of Prisoners 
of War and Detainees, in THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF WAR 394, 404 (Hew Strachan & Sibylle Scheipers eds., 2011).  
6
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 52 [2016], Iss. 2, Art. 20
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol52/iss2/20
 2017] PUNISHING WARMONGERS 247 
implicated war-powers at a time when tensions between Bismarck and the military 
were in high relief and military resources were stretched thin.29 October found Bis-
marck, Moltke, and the latter’s General Staff superficially at odds over strategy, but 
at a more fundamental level circling around the question of who should direct the 
war effort.30 Bismarck insisted that the immediate application of the most brutal tac-
tics would quickly bring the French to heel. He pushed for all franc-tireurs to be sum-
marily shot or hanged, to punish all non-cooperating French villages with the death 
of every male inhabitant, for French children who spat at Prussian troops to be shot, 
and for Paris to be bombarded as soon as it was surrounded.31 He complained when 
he was excluded from military conferences, and openly criticized the conduct of the 
war when his suggestions were not followed.32 The military, for its part, dismissed 
Bismarck’s operational counsels as “infantile” or needlessly bloodthirsty and refused 
to fulfill them, and ignored Bismarck’s demands that he attend operational meet-
ings.33 In spite of his protests that the realms of political and military conduct should 
be completely divorced from one another, Moltke was vocal in his opposition to the 
Chancellor’s efforts to negotiate with Bonaparte loyalists.34 
Inter-departmental friction was not the only barrier to war crimes trials. Bis-
marck’s plan would also have imposed a significant logistical burden at a time when 
the Prussian military was overtaxed. The Prussians were holding hundreds of thou-
sands of French prisoners (regular and irregular soldiers) in camps; these men needed 
to be fed and otherwise provided for.35 Sorting through the captured to identify those 
possibly guilty of war crimes whose cases were fit for prosecution on an international 
stage would have been a herculean undertaking with the great body of Prussian forces 
spread thin across French territory and preoccupied with an ongoing war. In addition 
to the complex mechanics of the endeavor, the military leadership would have also 
                                                                                                                   
 29. See generally Stig Forster, The Prussian Triangle of Leadership in the Face of a People’s War: A Reassessment of the Conflict 
Between Bismarck and Moltke, 1870-71, in ON THE ROAD TO TOTAL WAR: THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR AND THE 
GERMAN WARS OF UNIFICATION, 1861-1871, 115-40 (Stig Förster & Jörg Nagler eds., 1997). 
 30. WETZEL, A DUEL OF NATIONS, supra note 2, at 148-55; HOWARD, supra note 2, at 271, 279; GORDON A. 
CRAIG, THE POLITICS OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY 1640-1945, 209 (1955). 
 31. WAWRO, supra note 2, at 278-79; HOWARD, supra note 2, at 351-52, 280; BUSCH, supra note 18, at 254 (entry 
for October 14, 1870) (quoting Bismarck: “Every village in which an act of treachery has been committed should be 
burnt to the ground, and all the male inhabitants hanged.”). 
 32. WETZEL, supra note 2, at 150, 158; HOWARD, supra note 2, at 351. At the very same dinner at which he 
proposed the court, the Chancellor complained that Moltke, “whose profile resembles more and more every day that 
of a bird of prey,” was unresponsive to his plans. BUSCH, supra note 18, at 254 (entry for October 14, 1870). See also 
THE WAR DIARY OF THE EMPEROR FREDERICK III, 1870-1871, 155-56 (A. R. Allinson trans., 1926) [hereinafter 
FREDERICK III] (entry for October 12, 1870) (“Generals von Moltke and von Roon on the one side, Count Bismarck 
on the other, are often at loggerheads, the gist of their mutual reproaches being that the departments are kept sepa-
rated by too hard and fast a line and not enough reciprocal interchange of information practiced.”).  
 33. Leonhard Garf von Blumenthal, JOURNALS OF FIELD-MARSHAL COUNT VON BLUMENTHAL FOR 1866 AND 
1870-71 197 (Major A. D. Gillespie-Addison trans., 1903) (entry for November 21, 1870); CRAIG, supra note 29, at 
206-09; see also WETZEL, A DUEL OF NATIONS, supra note 2, at 150, 157; FREDERICK III, supra note 32, at 170 (entry 
for October 26, 1870). Moltke eventually legalized harsh measures other than summary execution against francs-tireurs. 
ISABEL V. HULL, ABSOLUTE DESTRUCTION: MILITARY CULTURE AND THE PRACTICES OF WAR IN IMPERIAL 
GERMANY 118 (2005). 
 34. CRAIG, supra note 30, at 208.  
 35. RACHEL CHRASTIL, ORGANIZING FOR WAR: FRANCE, 1870-1914 34 (2010); see generally Manfred Botzenhart, 
French Prisoner of War in Germany, 1870-71, in ON THE ROAD TO TOTAL WAR: THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR AND THE 
GERMAN WARS OF UNIFICATION, 1861-71 115-40 (Stig Förster & Jörg Nagler eds., 1997). 
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been required to invest significant intellectual capital in the project. Moltke and his 
advisers would have had to weigh in on a number of key legal questions, including 
how to define the crimes at issue so that Prussia’s position in future conflicts would 
not be prejudiced, the acceptability of a superior orders defense, and how to conduct 
the trials in accordance with military law. 
It is unimaginable that a proposal by Bismarck implicating such a significant 
reallocation of military personnel and intellectual capital would have been embraced 
by Moltke in the toxic atmosphere of mutual hostility and disdain that permeated 
Prussia’s campaign headquarters in October 1870. By contrast, acts of aggression, 
unlike war crimes, implicated only the political decisions of the French, and the lo-
gistics of arranging for international trials for aggressors—from the negotiations at-
tendant to the creation of an international court, to the selection of defendants and 
the initiation of prosecutions—could be handled almost exclusively though the exer-
cise of his own foreign affairs powers. 
Bismarck may also have been nudged in the direction of aggression prosecu-
tions by a gesture, just a few years previous, towards trying the crime. In 1864, Arch-
duke Ferdinand Maximilian von Hapsburg was appointed monarch of Mexico by 
Napoleon III.36 His rule was short lived; in 1867, the Archduke found himself unable 
to hold his government together after his patron withdrew the French army from the 
country.37 That year, Maximilian was deposed and court-martialed by the Republican 
forces he had displaced. The charges against him included;  
(1) “having offered himself as the principal instrument of the French government to 
carry out certain plans of intervention, which were to disturb the peace of Mexico, by 
means of a war, unjust in its origin, illegal in its form, disloyal and barbarous in its 
execution; . . .in order to destroy the constitutional government of the nation estab-
lished by the people . . . . [and] transform the republic into a monarchy;” (2) “having, 
with an armed force, disposed of the lives, rights, and interests of the Mexican people.” 
(3) “having made war against the Mexican Republic.” and (4) “having made, in his own 
name, a filibustering war, inviting and enlisting foreigners from all nations.”38  
Archival sources confirm that the Chancellor had attentively followed events in Mex-
ico for years and learned details of the prosecution through the Prussian minister in 
                                                                                                                   
 36. FREDERIC HALL, LIFE OF MAXIMILLIAN I, LATE EMPEROR OF MEXICO, WITH A SKETCH OF THE EMPRESS 
CARLOTA 69-70 (1868). 
 37. Id. at 220. 
 38. The indictment against Maximilian is reprinted in HALL, supra note 36, at 216-23. Maximilian was tried and 
punished pursuant to the “Law of Juarez” (passed in 1862), which covered crimes against the state, crimes against 
public peace and order, and crimes against the laws of nations. Id. at 222. The latter category included the crime of 
“induc[ing] citizens of the Republic . . . to serve another power, or to invade its territory” (Article 2(4)). Among 
crimes against the state there was listed; “Invitation made by Mexicans, or by foreign residents in the Republic, to 
the subjects of other powers, to invade national territory, or change the form of government which has been given 
to the Republic.” (Article 1(3)); “Any kind of complicity in exciting or preparing the invasion, or in favoring its 
realization and end.” (Article 1(4)); “in the places occupied by the invader, organizing any shadow of a government.” 
(Article 1(5)). A copy of the Law of Juarez is available in HALL. Id. at 243-252. Maximilian’s defense rested on the 
unconstitutionality of the court, his immunity from prosecution as a former head of state and current prisoner of 
war, the legality of his actions as monarch in the context of what he insisted was a civil, as opposed to interstate, war, 
and the rejoicing that greeted announcements of his (non-aggressive) seizure of power. Id. at 262-84.  
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Mexico City.39 A record of the Chancellor’s reaction to the trial has not yet been 
found, but it must have made an impression, as the prosecution of a monarch by a 
foreign state was virtually unheard of.40 Whether Maximillian’s trial influenced Bis-
marck’s calculations three years later cannot be established with any certainty. But the 
timing of the two aggression-related developments, as well as the Chancellor’s inter-
est in Mexican affairs, strongly suggests a link. 
The proposal is also surprising for the fact that the Chancellor had not previ-
ously exhibited any appetite for individual punishment. Just one month prior to sug-
gesting trials for the war’s instigators, he had opined to a Prussian newspaper that  
[t]he statesman has neither the authority nor the obligation to assume the office of 
judge. . . . Political principles do not even permit us to think of taking revenge for the 
present war, of which [Napoleon III] was the author. Were we to entertain such an 
idea, then it is . . . on every single Frenchman that we should wreak . . . vengeance; for 
the whole of France, with her thirty-five million inhabitants, showed . . . approval of, 
and enthusiasm for, this war.41  
What prompted the seeming shift from a policy of tolerated impunity to one of pur-
suing accountability for France’s opinion-makers? 
From the earliest days of the war, Bismarck’s greatest anxiety was that one or 
more of Europe’s other Powers would intervene, and that Prussia would be conse-
quently deprived of the opportunity to deal a crippling blow to France.42 Bismarck 
recognized that the longer the conflict continued, the more likely such undesirable 
intervention became. October, however, found his efforts to isolate the conflict run-
ning up against headwinds. First, Russia’s unilateral denouncement of the Black Sea 
clauses of the Treaty of 1856 in late October added to the generally noxious atmos-
phere permeating international relations, and necessitated the convocation of a Eu-
ropean Congress.43 The possibility that the situation in France would be placed on 
the agenda, or that a French representative mingling amongst Europe’s diplomats 
might find a foreign patron willing to intercede on France’s behalf weighed heavily 
on Bismarck’s mind.44 In short, in October the Russians had cracked open the door 
to intervention, and the need to expedite the peace negotiations had correspondingly 
amplified.45 
                                                                                                                   
 39. Bismarck observed as his Prussian minister in residence, Baron Anton von Magnus, cultivated closer than 
expected ties with the French-backed Emperor. KONRAD RATZ, EL OCASO DEL IMPERIO DE MAXIMILIANO VISTO 
POR UN DIPLOMA ́TICO PRUSIANO: LOS INFORMES DE ANTON VON MAGNUS A OTTO VON BISMARCK, 1866-1867 
218-57 (2014); Frank G. Weber, Bismarck’s Man in Mexico: Anton von Magnus and the End of Maximilian’s Empire, 46 
HISP. AM. HIST. REV. 53 (1966). 
 40. See generally A. Francis Steuart, Monarchs Tried by Enemies, 32 JURID. REV. 82 (1920). 
 41. BUSCH, supra note 18, at 140, 186-87 (Busch wrote these words, which were “very characteristic of the Chan-
cellor’s manner of thinking,” for publication in the Prussian press.). 
 42. WETZEL, supra note 2, at 20. 
 43. The Treaty of 1856 (or Treaty of Paris) ended the Crimean War and prohibited all nations from building and 
maintaining a naval fleet in the Black Sea. For more on the effects of the Russian abrogation on Great Power politics. 
See William Mulligan, Britain, the ‘German Revolution’, and the Fall of France, 1870/1, 84 HIST. RES. 310 (2011). 
 44. WETZEL, supra note 2, at 168-74; W. E. Mosse, The End of the Crimean System: England, Russia and the Neutrality 
of the Black Sea, 1870-1, 4 HIST. J. 164, 166 (1961). Prussia was aware of Russian intentions as early as mid-September. 
Id. at 166-67. 
 45. Later, Bismarck ensured that the French did not participate in the Congress by delaying the delivery of the 
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Unfortunately, since the Prussian victory at Sedan, peace talks had stalled. Dur-
ing September and October Bismarck negotiated with the newly formed GND as 
well as the deposed Second Empire, seeking a counterpart from either government—
it seems to have mattered very little to him which, so long as it could deliver on its 
promises—willing to surrender Alsace and most of Lorraine, and refrain from press-
ing demands that would prejudice the Prussian military advantage.46 But none of the 
factions with whom he dealt were willing to acknowledge France’s defeat and accept 
the military and political consequences, including territorial cession, Prussians felt this 
naturally entailed. 
The GND was the first party with which Bismarck treated. In mid-September, 
the newly appointed French Minister of Foreign Affairs Jules Favre met with Bis-
marck at Ferrières. Favre struggled to persuade his Prussian counterpart that Prussia’s 
quarrel had been not with France, but with Napoleon III, that relations between the 
two Powers could therefore proceed on a peacetime footing, and that an indemnity, 
as opposed to cession, would mark a fitting end to the war.47 But, Favre argued, in 
order to proceed on this basis, and in so doing spare Prussian troops from continued 
French sorties and the rigors of a debilitating winter, Bismarck would need to forgo 
the imposition of the most onerous conditions of peace, including territorial cession. 
The Chancellor would also need to agree to an armistice that would allow the GND 
to hold elections which, Favre was certain, would confirm the public’s desire for 
peace and legitimate the new government in its pursuit thereof.48 This armistice 
should be unconditional, as France would neither surrender any forts, nor concede 
her right to provision Paris during the ceasefire. 
Bismarck was unconvinced. He had already concluded that the future security 
of Prussia necessitated that France cede territory.49 Furthermore, France was in no 
position to think that Prussia wanted “peace at any price”; the occupiers, Bismarck 
correctly asserted, were positioned to dictate terms, and at any rate Prussia “would 
rather suffer now than pass the burden to our children.”50 An armistice might be 
arranged, but Bismarck insisted on equivalent sacrifices on the part of France, includ-
ing the handover of French territory and French forts, specifically the forts surround-
ing Paris, in the event the city was to be replenished.51 At any rate, Bismarck did not 
believe that elections would bear out Favre’s conviction that France had no appetite 
for prolonging the war; at one point he confronted the French Minister with a re-
cently published caricature from the Journal pour rire depicting Prussia as a dying el-
derly man being threatened and mocked by a French soldier, exclaiming “here is the 
                                                                                                                   
invitation to participate to the GDP, throwing up procedural barriers to French participation, and playing to the 
insecurities of the French representative such that he decided not to attend the conference. Id. at 174-75. But in 
October 1871 these solutions were in the future, and the problem of avoiding intervention remained acute. Id.  
 46. WETZEL, A DUEL OF NATIONS, supra note 2, at 74-75, 133. 
 47. JULES FAVRE, GOUVERNEMENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE 165-69 (1871).  
 48. Id. at 165-67. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 168. 
 51. WETZEL, A DUEL OF NATIONS, supra note 2, at 109. See also FIELD MARSHAL HELMUTH VON MOLTKE, 
THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR OF 1870-71, 129 (3d ed. 1992). 
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proof of your peaceful and moderate intentions[!]”52 The negotiations at Ferrières 
collapsed, each side walking away perceiving the others’ assumptions as flawed and 
demands as outrageous. 
Subsequent attempts at negotiation with the GND fared no better. On October 
8, Bismarck proposed a four week ‘semi-armistice,’ which the provisional Paris gov-
ernment could use to prepare for elections, as well as a forty-eight hour armistice in 
which to hold them. This was offered without any requirement of a territorial or 
military quid pro quo, though Paris would not be permitted to resupply.53 Favre refused 
to even consider the offer, responding that there would be “no armistice until the last 
German has been driven from French soil.”54 The GND’s obduracy frustrated the 
Chancellor immensely; at one point, an emotional Bismarck shrieked at Favre, “Think 
about it! Find a basis for peace, propose something!”55 The rejection of what was, from 
Bismarck’s perspective, a very generous offer confirmed in his mind that the French 
intended to use an armistice only as an opportunity to continue the war, and were 
not serious in their bids for peace.56 
Pourparlers with the deposed Empress Eugénie, exiled in London, had also run 
into the ground by late October. Early in her exile, the Empress had refused to take 
any action that might undermine the GND, and had even signaled her support for 
the provisional government to other Powers.57 By early October, she had abandoned 
this approach and dispatched a representative to Prussian military headquarters in 
Versailles authorized to offer the neutralization, but not the cession, of Alsace and 
Lorraine, and the relinquishment of the French colony in Cochin-China.58 But in her 
personal communications with the Prussian King, she requested outrageous terms of 
peace; a fourteen day armistice, the provisioning of the Army of the Rhine, and the 
declaration of her title as Regent of France, all while offering exactly nothing offered 
in return.59 Her terms were rejected, and the thread of negotiations with the Empress 
was not picked up again until late January, when she relented (too late, as it would 
turn out) on the question of the surrender of territory.60 
                                                                                                                   
 52. FAVRE, supra note 47, at 181-2. Favre dismissed the illustration as the sort of trivial “bad taste of pencil” that 
French politicians had long been subjected to, and suggested that the views reflected were not held by French states-
men. Id. 
 53. WETZEL, A DUEL OF NATIONS, supra note 2, at 113-4.  
 54. WAWRO, supra note 2, at 246.  
 55. Id. at 254. Moltke, who was content to allow the Parisians to starve over a period of months and felt no 
pressure to hasten the conclusion of the war, was more detached. “M. Favre has not yet come out from Paris again, 
and as he quite lately declared that . . . not a stone of French fortress should be surrendered, and as, besides this, the 
Parisians have, throughout the campaign, read news only of victories, they must be somewhat surprised to hear quite 
different proposals on a sudden. I should not be astonished to hear that they had murdered him.” LETTERS OF 
FIELD-MARSHAL COUNT HELMUTH VON MOLTKE TO HIS MOTHER AND HIS BROTHERS 193 (Clara Bell & Henry 
Fischer trans., 1891) (letter of September 21, 1870). 
 56. WAWRO, supra note 2, at 254.  
 57. COMTE MAURICE FLEURY, 2 MEMOIRS OF THE EMPRESS EUGÉNIE 537-8 (1920). 
 58. Id. at 55-58. 
 59. WETZEL, A DUEL OF NATIONS, supra note 2, at 125-8, 131-3; see also HAROLD KURTZ, THE EMPRESS 
EUGÉNIE, 1826-1920, 257 (1964).  
 60. Mehrkens, supra note 14, at 238. 
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In this way mid-October found Bismarck confounded on all sides by French 
representatives stubbornly refusing to accept the harsh consequences of defeat. As 
Lord Lyons, British Ambassador at Paris, put it: “it would no doubt be prudent for 
France to resign herself to sacrifices which ill-fortune in war had made necessary; but 
there was no one in France who appeared to be willing to incur the odium of even 
suggesting such a course . . . .”61 No doubt it was, at least in part, the exasperation 
and anxiety of dealing with parties who, “in spite of every new defeat, [grew] more 
obstinate in their resistance and more mendacious,”62 magnified by anxieties over 
imminent foreign intervention, that pushed Bismarck toward his scheme for ascribing 
blame for the war. In the Chancellor’s ideal scenario, the threat of prosecutions would 
work a coercive effect on the French plenipotentiaries, the idea being that the first 
government to agree to peace on Prussia’s terms would find in Bismarck a willing 
partner in consolidating its own authority by scapegoating its rival on an international 
stage while remaining itself immune to prosecution.63 In the event that neither of the 
rival factions took the bait, the international criminal court could be established with-
out French participation, and by virtue of the grandiosity of the international forum, 
the unprecedented nature of the charges, and the high profile of the defendants, the 
resulting trials would at any rate project Prussian authority and impress upon all of 
Prussia’s enemies in France the point of their absolute defeat. 
Bismarck might also have conceived of the larger European community as the 
audience for his trials. Verdicts placing responsibility for the war squarely on French 
shoulders might have reduced the likelihood of foreign intervention on behalf of 
France by Powers nervous that the annexation of two French provinces would de-
stabilize the European balance of power. With an eye towards the longer term, he 
might also have been interested in exculpating Prussia from charges that its own pol-
icies had fomented the conflict. Indeed, one of Bismarck’s earlier speeches to the 
Prussian Landtag (delivered in December 1850) indicates that the Chancellor had 
significant insight into the importance of establishing a casus belli that would remain 
persuasive throughout the period of national reflection that typically follows a war. 
“It is easy for a statesman,” he said “to ride the popular wave and sound the trump 
of war by his cozy hearth, or to intone thunderous speeches from a platform such as 
this, leaving it to the musketeer bleeding in the snow to settle whether his policies 
                                                                                                                   
 61. NA, FO 881/1897, No. 14, Lord Lyons to Earl Granville (sent October 18, 1870, received October 22, 1870) 
(reporting on a conversation between himself and the French General Bourbaki).  
 62. FREDERICK III, supra note 32, at 169 (entry for October 26, 1870). 
 63. Note in this regard that Bismarck was reported by Busch to have initially conceived of the international 
criminal court as available to try Thiers and Napoleon both, but that by the time the proposal was printed in the 
Correspondent the much more open-ended formula of “intellectual originators and instigators” was being used to des-
ignate Prussia’s targets. Either of France’s two competing party-claimants to the mantle of leadership could have 
argued that the other fell within the meaning of this term.  
Bismarck took every opportunity to play the two governments off each other. At his meeting with Favre at 
Ferrières, Bismarck showed the GND representative evidence that he was concurrently engaged in negotiations with 
the Bonaparts. FLEURY, supra note 57, at 531. During negotiations with Thiers in early November, Bismarck dis-
missed the Republican’s argument that an unconditional armistice would be in Prussia’s interests, as it would confirm 
the legitimacy of a party with whom Prussia could treat, by declaring that “so far from not having a Government 
with whom to treat, he had two – one at Paris and one at Wilhelmshöhe.” NA, FO 881/1897, No 163, Lord Lyons 
to Earl Granville (sent November 10, 1870, received November 12, 1870).  
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win glory or end in failure. Nothing simpler—but woe unto the statesman who at 
such a time fails to cast about for a cause of war that will stand up once the war is 
over.”64  
In addition to the pedagogical and coercive imperatives of prosecutions, it is 
almost certain that Bismarck’s proposal also was also rooted in a retributive impulse. 
There is good reason to believe that the proposed prosecution of “the journalists 
whose constant text was war, and who discounted the triumphs of the coming cam-
paign” was rooted in the punitive sentiments Bismarck had long harbored for the 
press.65 From his early days as a public official onwards, he was sensitive to criticism 
by journalists and editors, who he viewed as uninformed and contemptible when 
commenting on affairs of state.66 To discourage attacks, he would file endless libel 
suits against those that had, in his view, exceeded their purview.67 He was always, 
however, comfortable orchestrating massive government propaganda campaigns to 
shape public opinion when it suited his needs, as when he needed to fan the flames 
of anti-French sentiment back home.68 In short, the Chancellor was intuitively aware 
of the role of the press as a mediator between the state and the citizen, understood 
that a warpath could be paved and maintained by militant newspapers, and embraced 
the opportunity to counterattack in response to perceived media excesses. 
That the role of the French papers in undermining the peace negotiations was 
never far from Bismarck’s mind at this time is nowhere clearer than in the record of 
his September negotiations with Favre. At one point, the Chancellor interrupted the 
French Minister, who had suggested that the French people had being dragged into 
war against their will, to discuss his “old grudges,” including “the attitude of the press, 
the cheers of the Corps Legislatif, and the bellicosity and enthusiasm with greeted the 
declaration of war.”69 Bismarck subsequently questioned the Minister, who had sug-
gested that the “courageous,” “generous,” and “intelligent” population of Paris 
would support a pro-peace government in an upcoming election, “what then is meant 
by the violence of your press, the offensive caricatures, all the taunts, all the bluster 
against us?”70 A similarly revealing exchange took place during the September nego-
tiations over the surrender of Sedan with French General Emmanuel Félix 
                                                                                                                   
 64.  GERHARD RITTER, THE SWORD AND THE SCEPTER – THE PROBLEM OF MILITARISM IN GERMANY, 
VOLUME I: THE PRUSSIAN TRADITION 1740-1890 244 (Univ. of Miami Press 1969). 
 65. NORTH-GERMAN CORRESPONDENT, supra note 22.  
 66. He would later remark that when dealing with the press “[e]very . . . attack must be smashed, every insult 
must be avenged.” KATHARINE LERMAN, BISMARCK 203 (2004). The Prussian parliamentarian Christoph von 
Tiedemann reminisced of Bismarck and his relations with the press that “[h]e was always prepared to repay a pin-
prick with a knife thrust. It cannot be denied that his joy of combat often led him to fire upon sparrows with a 
cannon.” Keyserlingk, supra note 21, at 64-65. When frontal assaults failed, Bismarck was not above bribery. FRITZ 
STERN, GOLD AND IRON: BISMARCK, BLEICHRÖDER, AND THE BUILDING OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE 263 (1977). 
 67. Robert H. Keyserlingk, Bismarck and Freedom of the Press in Germany – 1866-1890, 11 CANADIAN J. HIST. 25, 
27-28 (1976). 
 68.  Id. 
 69. FAVRE, supra note 47, at 167. 
 70. Id. at 175. Favre replied that the same agitations existed on the other side of the Rhine. Id. 
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de Wimpffen. A never-ending war, Wimpffen argued, could only be avoided if Prus-
sia was generous in the terms of surrender she would accept.71 When Bismarck chal-
lenged this, pointing France’s history of aggressive wars, Wimpffen replied that it was 
not appropriate to judge France by the utterances of contemporary “irresponsible 
journalists.”72 The French people, he claimed, were not the warmongers they may 
once have been under Louis XIV or the first Napoleon. But Bismarck would have 
none of it. The present war, he said, proved the opposite. “The reasoning and think-
ing men of the people . . . did not desire this war, but they gave way without a strug-
gle.”73 Moreover, “it was those men, who in your country [France] make governments 
and depose them, the agitators and journalists” that Prussia “wishes to punish.”74 The 
war was their fault, and it was “on their account that we must march on Paris.”75 
Bismarck was correct in his assessment that the Paris press had embraced the 
war wholeheartedly. It had also, despite the overwhelming strength of the Prussian 
position, downplayed news of military defeats, instead reporting on the righteousness 
of the French cause, the demoralized state and moral bankruptcy of the Prussian 
forces, the adequacy of the city’s defenses, and what amounted to rumors of foreign 
intervention; all sources of hope for the beleaguered French population.76 To the 
extent that the papers encouraged the French public in its unrealistic expectations, 
and by extension emboldened his negotiating counterparts, Bismarck’s exasperation 
doubtless grew with each self-righteous gazette from Paris that crossed his desk 
through the fall season.77 How satisfying it would be, his thinking must have been, 
to grind up one manipulator of public opinion (the French press) in the gears of 
another (a new international court). 
* * * 
Bismarck’s choice of forum to air his proposal—the North-German Correspondent 
was an English-language weekly “founded with a view to influenc[e] the English 
                                                                                                                   
 71. BRUNO GARLEPP, GERMANY’S IRON CHANCELLOR 146 (Sidney Whitman trans., 1897). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 146-47. 
 75. Id. at 147; see also HOWARD, supra note 2, at 220. 
 76. Hazel C. Benjamin, Official Propaganda and the French Press during the Franco-Prussian War, 4 J. MOD. HIST. 214, 
222-29 (1932).  
The French press was widely perceived to be responsible for prolonging the conflict by presenting a distorted 
picture of events. On October 12 Moltke wrote of the defeat of the French Army of the Loire: “Will this unhappy 
country discern at last that it is conquered, that its condition is worse every day? But I have no doubt that news of a 
victory is even now being published.” LETTERS OF FIELD-MARSHAL, supra note 55, at 196. Prince Frederick III, 
writing in his journal in the aftermath of the Battle of Chevilly, which was a rout for the French, stated his belief that 
“such arrant liars are the French, they will find a way to picture yesterday as another victory and celebrate it as such,” 
and after the defeat of the Army of the Loire pronounced that he was “still afraid nothing will ever teach the deluded, 
pig-headed Parisians, and that they prefer to wait for famine to come.” FREDERICK III, supra note 32, at 143 (entry 
for October 1, 1870), 154 (entry for October 12, 1870). Sackville West, dispatched at the behest of Lord Lyons, 
British Ambassador at Paris, to assess sentiment in France’s départemenets, reported that “the provincial press . . . has 
done much to provoke [savage and reckless] sentiments, and is doing all it can to render an honorable peace impos-
sible.” NA, FO 881/1895, Inclosure 2 in Lord Lyons to Earl Granville (sent October 15, 1870, received October 19, 
1870). 
 77. Id. See also WETZEL, A DUAL OF NATIONS, supra note 2, at 153. 
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press”—as well as his decision to do so without his name attached suggests that he 
was testing the waters to see how his proposal would be received.78 There is nothing 
in the national archives of the US or Great Britain to suggest that either country was 
ever formally approached about potentially participating in an international criminal 
court. Nor, for that matter, is there any evidence that the idea was ever entertained 
in British or US government circles on the basis of the Correspondent article. If these 
neutral Powers considered the proposal, their views, like the reason for the silence of 
the diplomatic record, remain submerged. 
The response of the English-language press was also muted, though a small 
number of papers did examine the merits of the plan. While a few papers found the 
prospect of punishing the Bonapartes appealing, most dailies and weeklies were cool 
to the idea.79 Perhaps apprehensive about the fate of their chroniqueur brethren in 
France, a number of papers directed their scorn at the attempt to reach the war’s 
‘intellectual instigators.’ The Liberal Daily News, for example called attention to the 
line-drawing problem it perceived by invoking the specter of a cadaver synod for long 
deceased French luminaries: 
How is the vivacious Correspondenz to revenge itself on all the poets, statesmen, soldiers, 
and priests who have died since they hinted at something about taking possession of 
the Rhine? What is to be done to Alfred de Musset, for example, who wrote the silly 
verses which were so opportune a cry for the Empire when it resolved upon war? 
What is to be done to de Morny, who helped to build up the Empire on principles 
which, in the end, made war necessary? What is to be done to old Mocquard, who 
worked so diligently at all those schemes of the Empire which were involved in those 
principles? Indeed, if we are to go back step by step to the originators of the war, what 
is to be done to the potentates who formed the Holy Alliance, which made war upon 
                                                                                                                   
 78. BUSCH, supra note 18, at 56. 
 79. The Western Daily Press, without taking sides on the question of responsibility for the war, supported Prussia’s 
“singular proposal” and argued that the high number of casualties demanded “fix[ing] upon some individual, or set 
of individuals, the odium of the great crime.” The Grand Inquest, WESTERN DAILY PRESS (Bristol England), Nov. 1, 
1870, at 2.   
  Reynold’s Newspaper, a London-based anti-royalist weekly with a circulation of 350,000, came out strongly in 
favor of Bismarck’s “capital proposition,” at least to the extent that it would result in the deaths of the Bonapartists, 
Napoleon and Eugénie in particular: 
[W]e presume that the ex-Emperor and Empress, with their surroundings, are comprised amongst what 
is termed the “entire executive;” for, if not, the chief culprits escape the punishment that would overtake 
their tools and subordinates. It is deplorable to read the accounts contained in foreign journals of poor 
peasants being summarily show because they attempted to defend their little gardens or hen-roosts from 
being pillaged by Prussian marauders; of young men being executed because they dared to fire a shot in 
defense of their country; of old men, women, and children thrust out of their homesteads, to perish of 
cold and hunger, by the implacable invaders; and of countless other horrors that have overtaken the 
unfortunate French people, – and know all the while that the persons who originated all this misery and 
distress are far from the scene of devastation, and living in ease, comfort, and luxury elsewhere. . . .  
We shall never have an end of wars and warfare until those who cause them are treated as outcasts and 
outlaws. To hang up Napoleon on a gibbet as high as there whereon Haman swung, would be a most 
useful lesson to both monarchs and their satellites. 
More Imperialist Intrigues, REYNOLDS’S NEWSPAPER (London, England), Nov. 6, 1870. For circulation information see 
‘Reynolds News,’ available at http://www.bradford.ac.uk/library/special-collections/collections/reynolds-news/. 
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France, which paid them back, which took more than belonged to it, and so on, and 
so on . . . ?80 
The scheme was consequently dismissed as “a harmless joke” on the part of the 
Correspondent.81 In the United States the Boston Daily Advertiser reached the same con-
clusion; that if the scheme were implemented, everyone from Napoleon downward, 
including high profile French artists and composers whose works merely celebrated 
the l’esprit national, as well as the humble caricaturist, who had “egg[ed] on that spirit 
of contemptuousness for Prussia which popularized the war,” would find themselves 
in the dock. This presumptively absurd result was treated as beneath serious consid-
eration.82 
The response of the Bristol Times and Mirror is particularly notable for the breadth 
and sophistication of the objections raised. The author argued that whatever respon-
sibility the French Cabinet bore for instigating the war, it did not “confer an exclusive 
right to the other side to proffer indictments against France” especially since “plan-
ning possible campaigns in France was [also] the favourite recreation in Prussian mil-
itary circles.”83 The line between a belligerent “resolved on making war and [that] 
assumed the initiative” and one that “so far from trying to avert [it], prepared to meet 
attack with attack” was too thin to justify prosecution of one side by another.84 Prus-
sia, the author emphasized, was wrong to assume that “all the offenders would be 
found west of the Rhine, however slight the prima facie evidence might be for putting 
others at the east of it upon their trial.”85 Keeping with the theme of double stand-
ards, the paper pointed out that Prussia was an unsuitable herald for the suggested 
evolution in international law; Wilhelm I, as “a believer in the Divine rights of rulers 
                                                                                                                   
 80. DAILY NEWS (London, England), Nov. 2, 1870, at 5 (the author also quipped that “[i]f proof of intellect be 
required, there will escape many a member of the recent [French] Government, and perhaps the most talkative of 
the present Government [of National Defense].”). Alfred de Musset (1810–1857) was a French poet and playwright. 
‘Alfred de Musset’, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, available at http://www.britannica.com/biography/Alfred-de-
Musset. Charles-Auguste-Louis-Joseph, duke de Morny (1811–1865) was a president of the Corps Leigslatif from 1854 
until the end of his life. ‘Charles-Auguste-Louis-Joseph, duke de Morny’, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, available at 
http://www.britannica.com/biography/Charles-Auguste-Louis-Joseph-duc-de-Morny. Jean-François Constant 
Mocquard (1791–1864) was a former senator who served as Napoleon’s Chief of Staff between 1848 and 1864. See 
generally DENIS HANNOTIN, JEAN-FRANÇOIS-CONSTANT MOCQUARD, 1791-1864: CHEF DU CABINET DE 
NAPOLÉON III (2014). 
The Daily News often received guidance from British Foreign Secretary Granville, though there is nothing in 
his surviving correspondence to the paper’s editor, Frank Hill, to indicate that this article reflected the position of 
the Foreign Office. See NA, PRO 30/29/426; see also LUCY BROWN, VICTORIAN NEWS AND NEWSPAPERS 177-81 
(1985). 
 81. DAILY NEWS (London, England), Nov. 2, 1870, at 5.  
 82. Summary of European News, BOSTON DAILY ADVERTISER, Dec. 6, 1870, at 3. In the US, the second paragraph 
of the proposal also appeared in the NEW YORK TRIBUNE, but without commentary. Proposed German Punishment, 
NEW YORK TRIBUNE, Nov. 14, 1870, at 2. 
 83. A New Peace Preservation Scheme, BRISTOL TIMES AND MIRROR (Bristol, England), Nov. 7, 1870, at 2. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. A few other papers pointed to Prussian hypocrisy. See Punishment of Peacebreakers, WATERFORD DAILY 
MAIL (Waterford, Ireland), Nov. 9, 1870, at 3 (“[If trials are retrospective] what will become of Count Bismarck?”); 
GLASGOW EVENING POST (Glasgow, Scotland), Oct. 31, 1870, at 2 (“[I]f such a trial is to take place, how will Bis-
marck escape arraignment?”). 
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. . . would be the last to entertain or submit to an international jury for the trial of 
peace-breakers.”86 
The Bristol Times’ objections were not solely grounded in moral criteria. The 
paper pointed out that ascertaining who among the French was genuinely guilty and 
their degree of responsibility would be challenging. It then posed a series of questions 
that illustrated just how undertheorized the proposed international criminal prosecu-
tions were: assuming fair and accurate guilty verdicts were possible, “what would be 
the nature and object of the punishment?” Would the guilty be exiled? Would their 
punishment be reformative or retributive? Was there an authority in existence “capa-
ble of enforcing the execution of the sentences pronounced?”87 Finally, the proposed 
court, if called into existence, would raise “delicate and dangerous” questions con-
cerning relations “between Sovereigns and Governments and their peoples.”88 Even 
if prosecutions discouraged sovereigns from inter-state conflict in the future, it would 
be at the high cost of exacerbating intra-state tension: 
Hitherto a subject has been amenable only to his sovereign and the laws of his own 
country; but loyalty itself might under such inquiry be a crime in the eyes of an inter-
national tribunal, and treason a virtue; so that in setting up a judicial court for those 
who break the peace between national and nation there would be a danger of breaking 
the peace within narrower limits by creating discord between the ruled and their rul-
ers.89 
* * * 
Establishing the proposed international court with the participation of a neutral 
Great Power in 1870-71 would have required either a groundswell of public support 
or the patronage of at least one non-Prussian diplomat-advocate willing to shepherd 
it to completion. But the proposal never found its international footing, and in the 
end, there were no war responsibility trials. Questions of personal accountability were 
not taken up during the negotiations of the Armistice (signed January 1871) or De-
finitive Treaty of Peace (signed May 1871), and ultimately only traditional collective 
punishments of territorial surrender and indemnity were imposed on France.90 
                                                                                                                   
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. THE OBSERVER’S Prussia correspondent, who would have considered the scheme “a mere hobby of some 
political theorist” if not for its placement in the North German Correspondent, came closest to highlighting the ex post 
facto problem that would doubtless have been raised at trial. While expressing no opinion as to the merits of the 
proposal, the author noted the transformative effect the prosecutions would have on international law. Puzzling over 
Prussia’s intentions, the author speculated (generously) that the German government “really desire[d] . . . to codify 
the whole system.” Prussia, THE OBSERVER (London, England), Oct. 27, 1870, at 5. Reprinted at Proposed International 
Criminal Trial of the French War Instigators, THE BELFAST NEWSLETTER (Belfast, Ireland), Nov. 1, 1870, at 2. 
 90. ROBERT I. GIESBERG, THE TREATY OF FRANKFORT: A STUDY IN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY SEPTEMBER 1870-
SEPTEMBER 1873, 273, 283 (1963) (containing the text of both treaties, as well as some draft terms). No notes were 
taken during the Armistice negotiations, but Favre did discuss them in his memoires. See WETZEL, DUEL OF 
NATIONS, supra note 2, at 185 (citing Jules Favre, 2 Gouvernement de a Defense Nationale 362-417 (1871-75)). See also the 
memoires of M. le Comte D’Herisson, Journal of a Staff-Officer in Paris during the events of 1870 and 1871, 300-
29 (1885). 
  In late January 1870 a rumor made the rounds in Paris that Bismarck and Moltke insisted that the French, as 
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While Bismarck’s proposal received a chilly reception, in the decades following 
the Franco-Prussian War, international criminal law entered a period of accelerated 
(but unobtrusive) development. In 1872, Swiss jurist Gustave Moynier, disappointed 
by the conduct of the belligerents in the Franco-Prussian War, proposed the creation 
of an international criminal court to adjudicate claims of violation of the 1864 Geneva 
Convention.91 The Great Powers collectively took up the idea of internationalized 
penal proceedings five years later as they formulated their response to the notorious 
“Bulgarian horrors;” they pushed the Ottoman government (in vain) to accept the 
establishment of an ‘international commission’ with explicit authority to “find out 
the culprits, [] superintend the examinations, and [] insure punishment” of “the per-
petrators of the massacres and other excesses,” and take part in a revision of the 
sentences against guilty parties that had already been announced by the Ottoman 
authorities.92 In 1893, a Franco-Siamese Mixed Court was established to try a Siamese 
governor, Phra Yot, who stood accused of war crimes.93 Finally, as the world ap-
proached the end of the nineteenth-century, the Powers twice more took steps to 
punish violations of international law; international military tribunals were established 
                                                                                                                   
a prerequisite to negotiations, surrender General Ducrot, who was accused of violating the terms of his parole as a 
POW by escaping to Paris, for trial before a joint French-German court of honor. War Notes, MORNING POST, Feb. 
11, 1871, at 6. I have not found any official document to indicate that Bismarck returned to his idea of an international 
trial at this time; in all probability, the rumor was rooted in the fact that the Emperor had explained to Favre during 
the armistice negotiations in late January that military matters should be decided between commanders, and that the 
impugned Ducrot, one of the few high-ranking generals at Favre’s disposal, would not be an acceptable negotiating 
counterpart. FREDERICK III, supra note 32, at 285 (entry for January 26, 1870). Per subsequent press reports, a Prus-
sian inquiry subsequently exonerated Ducrot. News from Paris, DAILY NEWS, Feb. 23, 1871, at 2. 
 91. Christopher Keith Hall, The First Proposal for a Permanent International Criminal Court, 322 INTERNATIONAL 
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 57 (1998). 
 92. Turkey No. 2 (1877), Correspondence Respecting the Conference at Constantinople and the Affairs of Tur-
key: 1876-1877 (Harrison and Sons), Annexes 2, 3, 4 and 5 to Compte-Rendu No. 8, in Inclosure 4 to No. 135, 
Marquis of Salisbury to the Earl of Derby (sent December 23, 1876, received January 6, 1877). 
  The International Commission proposed in response to the Bulgarian atrocities was inspired by a similar 
body established in 1860, comprised of representatives from the Ottoman Empire, Britain, France, Prussia, Austria 
and Russia, and dispatched to Ottoman Syria to “determine the responsibility of all persons concerned” in a spate of 
inter-ethnic attacks. After several months designing the courts before which participants in and instigators of the 
disturbance would be tried, observing local proceedings, setting prosecutorial policy, and reviewing the verdicts 
handed down by Ottoman judges en masse, the Syria Commissioners pushed their mandate to its limit by setting aside 
a local verdict and considering a particularly controversial case on its merits, self-consciously assuming the role of 
judges in the process. 
  The Commissioners were unable to agree on the type of evidence that should be considered, whether the 
evidence showed the accused was guilty, which theory of liability should apply, what defenses might apply and 
whether a capital sentence should be handed down. They ultimately retreated from their ‘judicial’ role without reach-
ing a decision in the controversial case, leaving it for the political branches of their various governments to reach a 
compromise. They did, however, continue to exercise supervisory and administrative powers over the transitional 
justice process. The bona fides of the international commission as an international criminal court are ambiguous, as 
the powers and independence of the Commissioners were inconsistently conceived and nebulously defined among 
the participating states. Benjamin Brockman-Hawe, ‘Constructing Humanity’s Justice: Accountability for ‘Crimes Against Hu-
manity’ in the Wake of the Syria Crisis of 1860’ in HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: VOLUME 
3, at 181-291, 210-28 (Morten Bergsmo, Cheah Wui Ling, Song Tianying & Yi Ping eds., 2016). 
 93. Benjamin E. Brockman-Hawe, A Supranational Criminal Tribunal for the Colonial Era: The Franco-Siamese Mixed 
Court in THE HIDDEN HISTORIES OF WAR CRIMES TRIALS 50-76 (Kevin Heller & Gerry Simpson eds., 2013). 
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in Crete (1898) and China (1900) to try those responsible for outbreaks of mass in-
ter-ethnic violence.94 Bismarck’s proposal thus prefigured the turn towards interna-
tional and individualized justice of the latter third of the nineteenth-century and be-
yond. 
But Bismarck’s scheme ultimately amounted to more than a mere harbinger of 
events to come. A few of Bismarck’s twentieth-century successors invoked the 1870 
scheme in the course of making their own contributions to the development of in-
ternational criminal law, infusing his proposal with an intellectual vitality and legacy 
that is virtually unique among the aforementioned nineteenth-century precursors.95 
Subsequent generations, shaped by new ideologies and changed political contexts, 
treated the proposal variously as a catalyst for inspiration, an ironic precedent, or as 
a metric for gauging the wisdom of the justice endeavors of their day. 
In 1898, Busch’s Bismarck: Secret Pages of His History appeared and reacquainted 
readers with the Chancellor’s plan.96 The book was widely read, and the relevant pas-
sages stimulated the Chairman of the Society for the Promotion of Permanent and 
Universal Peace to call for the establishment of “a National Court, a Christian Court, 
. . . to sit in judgment upon those who fomented discord among nations” at the So-
ciety’s annual meeting.97 
During the First World War the proposal was discussed several times in the 
press. First, the anonymous Austrian author of an epistle in The International blaming 
the French for the First World War used the proposed court as an example of the 
sorts of extreme measures the French habitually provoked others into consideration. 
It was “owing to the intimidating effect of their chauvinism,” that Bismarck had 
wished the creation of “an international court for such braggarts, before whom all 
jingos [bellicose patriots] would have to appear before a war.”98 After the war, the 
proposed court was positioned by authors from various Allied countries as an exam-
ple of why Germans responsible for the war could and should be tried. In 1919, The 
Auckland Star (New Zealand) reviewed several Bismarck’s decisions during the 1870 
                                                                                                                   
 94. R. John Pritchard, International Humanitarian Intervention and Establishment of an International Jurisdiction over Crimes 
against Humanity: the National and International Military Trials in Crete in 1898 in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: 
ORIGINS, CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS 1-87 (John Carey et al. eds., 2003); Benjamin E. Brockman-Hawe, Accountability 
for “Crimes against the Laws of Humanity” in Boxer China: an experiment with international justice at Paoting-Fu, 38U. PENN. 
J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2017). 
  Each of the aforementioned gestures towards international justice contributed to the development of a vo-
cabulary of international criminal law, and (as I have argued elsewhere) shaped public expectations of accountability 
as well as the ways that subsequent generations of problem solvers thought about how to deliver on those expecta-
tions. But they seldom directly influenced the discussions associated with the field’s most critical twentieth century 
formative moments, in particular the adoption of the plan to try Kaiser Wilhelm II and his circle in the 1919 Versailles 
Treaty, and the 1945 decision to try high ranking Nazi officials before an Allied tribunal. The International Commis-
sion for Paoting-Fu, established in Boxer China (1900) for the trial of four pro-Boxer officials who had encouraged 
violence against Western and Chinese Christians, is the exception among the aforementioned experiments. It was 
invoked by the US legal advisers to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 for the proposition that international law 
permitted only political, as opposed to legal, punishment for international crimes. David Hunter Miller and James 
Brown Scott, 1 MY DIARY AT THE CONFERENCE OF PARIS, WITH DOCUMENTS 86 (1924). 
 96. BUSCH, supra note 18. 
 97. ‘Annual Meeting of the Peace Society, at Exeter, October 18th, 1898’ in Office of the Peace Society, 25 THE 
HERALD OF PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION – A MONTHLY JOURNAL 160 (no year). 
 98. Anonymous, J’accuse Anatole France, in IX THE INTERNATIONAL 372 (December 1915). 
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negotiations. After noting the cynicism with which Bismarck—who the paper blamed 
for the Franco-Prussian conflagration—had called for the establishment of an inter-
national court to affix blame on “innocent [French] journalists and blameless Minis-
ters,” the author declared his appreciation that the “wheel of fate [had] come [ ]full 
circle,” as well as his hope that Allies would “make a harder peace” than Bismarck’s. 
99 Finally, in an article appearing in The Living Age (New York), popular essayist Fran-
cis Gribble made the case for trying highly placed government and military officials, 
popular writers, ecclesiastics, and “men of science” who had instigated the war and 
contributed to its associated barbarities.100 “[T]here the programme is,” he wrote of 
the 1870 plan, “a German programme, and a good one, excluding respect of persons 
[amnesties], and contemplating the arraignment of an Emperor and his advisers; and 
the case for adopting it is infinitely stronger now than it was at the time when it was 
sketched.”101 
At least one participant in the post-WWI ‘Commission on the Responsibility of 
the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties’, convened by the Entente 
Powers at the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919, was aware of Bismarck’s pro-
posal. James Brown Scott, one of two legal advisors to the US delegation, argued 
against trying the Kaiser before an international court. Trials, he contended, too often 
created martyrs whose families, with popular support, ultimately inherited their au-
thority. History had shown time and again that regime change could only come about 
through exile and oblivion. As for the proposed prosecution of Napoleon III, in light 
of the European experiences with Mary Queen of Scots, Charles I, and Louis XVI, 
all of whom were tried but whose descendants regained the throne, it was “better for 
the world that the suggestion of Bismarck ha[d] not been followed.”102 
Bismarck’s proposal also became part of the conversation surrounding the 
post-WWII trials of Nazis. The reproduction of the proposal in the American Bar 
Association’s eponymous Journal in 1947 prompted one of many harangues against 
the Nuremberg trials in the right-wing Chicago Daily Tribune.103 For this commentator, 
the 1870 proposal served as a yardstick against which the Allied trial program was 
assessed and found wanting. The chief American architects of the trials—former Sec-
retary of War Stimson and Supreme Court Justice Jackson (also chief prosecutor at 
Nuremberg)—according to the Tribune, compared unfavorably to Bismarck, as the 
Chancellor at least had the wisdom to anticipate that “a war guilt finding would ex-
acerbate relations between France and Germany, so that hate would find expression 
in another war,” and abandon his plans for a trial.104 Moreover, Bismarck’s proposed 
                                                                                                                   
 99. Bismarck’s Tactics, THE AUCKLAND STAR, Feb. 1, 1919, at 13. 
 100. Francis Gribble, Peace without Amnesties, 12 THE LIVING AGE 385 (1918).  
 101. Id. at 388. 
 102. James Brown Scott, The Trial of the Kaiser, in WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS: THE STORY OF THE PEACE 
CONFERENCE, 1918-1919, BY AMERICAN DELEGATES 231, 247 (Edward House & Charles Seymour, eds., 1921). 
 103. A German View of “War Guilt” in 1870, 33ABA JOURNAL 115 (1947); Genesis of the War Crimes Trials, CHICAGO 
DAILY TRIBUNE, Mar. 16, 1947, at 20. 
 104. A German View of “War Guilt” in 1870, supra note 103. The author of the Tribune article was unable to keep up 
a consistent argument as to why the 1870 trials never happened. A few sentences before those reproduced in this 
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trials enjoyed a superior moral position to those held at Nuremberg; the possibility 
of French participation in 1870 meant the defeated would have had “a voice in judg-
ing their leaders in a disastrous war,” a charity that was not extended to post-war 
Germany.105 
* * * 
The modern international criminal lawyer cannot help but reflect on this tale 
with some sense of sadness. For champions of international accountability, the events 
of 1870 represent a missed opportunity. In contrast with Moynier’s relatively con-
servative suggestion, made only in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War, for the 
establishment of an international court with jurisdiction over violations of the Ge-
neva Convention, Bismarck’s scheme was no mere academic flight of fancy. Rather, 
by virtue of its source, the proposal amounted to actual state endorsement of an in-
ternational criminal court, with explicit and exceptional authority over broadly con-
ceived crimes of aggression. Trials, had they taken place, would have credited the 
precedent in the minds of nineteenth-century international lawyers steeped in a pos-
itivist legal culture that emphasized state practice as an indicia of law’s existence. In 
turn, guilty verdicts might have set rules governing the use of force, and inaugurated 
a new era of judicial and individualized punishment. Indeed, one may query what, if 
Bismarck’s desired epilogue to the War come to fruition, the field might look like 
today; how would an early experience prosecuting aggressors distant from the very 
top leadership positions of the state, including members of the press, have changed 
later agendas? Might some of the shortcomings of the Kampala Amendments to the 
Rome Statute—their failure to include a crime of incitement to aggressive war and 
entrenchment of an expectation that only the most influential among a state’s highest 
leadership would be prosecuted for their crimes against peace—have been 
avoided?106  
For those of a more cynical persuasion, there is much to unpack as well; Bis-
marck’s shrewd use of the language of international accountability in an effort to 
strong-arm the French into capitulating to his demands, as well as the uses made of 
the (non-) precedent by two generations of anti-accountability advocates in the 
United States, does not fit with the idealistic and progressive narrative of international 
criminal law’s development that dominates the field today. One thing all will be able 
                                                                                                                   
paper, he argued that it was the fact that the Chancellor “could not count on the English and the Russians to coop-
erate in a judicial lynching” that derailed his plans.  
  Glenn Hoover, professor of economics at Mills College in California, also mentioned the proposal in passim 
in his anti-prosecution Outlook for “War Guilt” Trials. Glenn E. Hoover, The Outlook for “War Guilt” Trials, 59 
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 40, 42 (1944). 
 105. Id. Criticism of the IMT was common before, during, and (for years) after its operation. See e.g. RICHARD 
HARWOOD, NUREMBERG AND OTHER WAR CRIMES TRIALS – A NEW LOOK 56 (1978).   
 106. MICHAEL KEARNEY, PROHIBITION OF PROPAGANDA FOR WAR IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 242 (2007) (ar-
guing that such a move is imperative if we are to fulfill the promise made in the wake of the Second World War that 
its horrors would not be repeated); Mark Drumbl, The Push to Criminalize Aggression: Something Lost Amid the Gains, 41 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 291, 314 (2009) (maintaining that “there is room for including upper and senior ranks [in 
the Rome Statute] in a way that falls outside of the absolutely high leadership requirement but does not begin to 
approach mass punishment.”). 
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to agree on, however, is that the story deserves to be remembered, and should not be 
allowed to slip into obscurity. 
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